Saturday, April 30, 2011

Injustice of the week: Supreme Court Give Big Business License to Steal...

The Corporate Supreme Court is getting good at this. You would  better with a Taliban Tribal Council than with the "gang of five" on almost any civil justice issue. I am serious you really would as one of the Taliban courts guiding principles is equity and justice. These guys are the "Goldman Sachs" of the judicial world. Never meet a monied interest they didn't like. Dark days are ahead for the few rights left for average AAmerican citizens. Maybe it is time to start dusting off the court stacking plan, or at least maybe we can get with the tea party and just eliminate 90% of their budget. If some of these guys actually had to live in the real world and maybe be forced to sign about 20 of these things a day, maybe they would have a different view point. I doubt it though as when you have no empathy for average Americans it doesn't matter.  I just hope they don't put giving up your religion, right to vote, or habeus corpus on an arbitration clause cause or these guys will damn sure go for it. In Minnesota a major corporation is already arguing that you can arbitrate out of a Federal Sherman anti-trust violation. (criminal abuse of monopoly power) This will soon be law of the land I have no doubt. Rather than give you a full analysis I am just going to be lazy and post my favorite articles. Basically ATT got caught screwing customers for a few dollars a month on bogus tax charges. (Do you really all those tax and access charges on your cell bill are correct) They got sued in a class as no way you can litigate a case over 60 bucks, but 60 times 1000 or 1000000 you can. ATT has a provison in its agreement as does Cellular South, Comcast, Your bank, Blue Cross and everyone other big Corporation saying they can not be sued in a class or any collection of cases and each claim must be arbitrated individually. As arbitrations are not free and cost a minimal of $1,500 a piece any one taking these cases would lose at least $1400 dollars even if they won.  Get it, it is a license to steal. (Unless you happen to live in California or Washington as theses Supreme Courts have said such provision violate their state constitutions. (Until Big Business finds a way to get this in front of the "gang of five" on Federal Due process or something.


This is the print preview: ack to norma view »
David Arkush

David Arkush

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U.S. Supreme Court to Major Corporations: You Write the Rules

Posted: 04/28/11 05:06 PM ET
On Wednesday the U.S. Supreme Court sided with AT&T in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion -- a decision with devastating consequences for consumer protection and civil rights. In essence, AT&T asked the court to allow it to use the fine print of contracts to eliminate class actions, a practice that flouts the laws of 20 states. In a 5-4 decision, the court granted AT&T's request.
The case's potential impact is breathtaking. Corporations can now prevent consumers and small business owners from exercising what is often their only real option for challenging companies that defraud them by millions or even billions of dollars: banding together to file class action lawsuits. The case could be equally devastating to millions of non-union employees, who need class actions to challenge systemic discrimination by their employers. The Supreme Court has given major corporations the green light to engage in nearly limitless wrongdoing against others, so long as they do it in relatively small dollar amounts, which ensures that no one can afford to challenge the misconduct without a class action.
A sudden demise of class actions will shock the markets and the legal system. It will dramatically increase the market power of major corporations over ordinary Americans and small business owners, who are already outmatched. Innumerable laws that protect the public will become irrelevant because few people can enforce them.
Yet for all these far-reaching implications, AT&T's achievement is remarkably ordinary. The company has secured a state of lawlessness similar to the one that allowed banks to foreclose on millions of homeowners without showing evidence that they had the right to do so. It has achieved a deregulatory regime similar to those that tanked the economy and destroyed millions of jobs, devastated the Gulf of Mexico with oil, allow thousands of preventable workplace deaths every year and threaten untold upheaval through climate change. Like the big banks, the oil and coal companies and the mine operators, AT&T simply wants to write its own rules. It's doing just that, through a practice that has become so ordinary we hardly notice the absurdity and injustice anymore: writing one-sided contracts and imposing them on others.
Why corporations are permitted to do anything important through standard-form contracts is somewhat of a mystery. Companies hire armies of lawyers to draft and redraft these contracts, claiming every new advantage they can wring out of legal developments. They secure "consent" by holding our credit cards or cell phones for ransom, saying we must submit to the new terms or immediately stop using them. Some companies even do this with people's jobs, telling employees they must sign new contracts or be fired (never mind that contract law is supposed to be based on mutual consent).
The average American is deluged with hundreds of thousands of fine-print words each year that no one reads and no one understands -- but that everyone is bound by. Avoiding these contracts is impossible unless one eschews most consumer products and services. Courts uphold adhesion contracts with a breeziness that is astonishing, especially since judges themselves don't read the fine print (John Roberts, chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has said he doesn't read it). The effect is nothing short of privatization of the law, with major corporations writing the rules and imposing them on the rest of us.
If recent crises have taught us anything, it's that disaster follows quickly when companies have too little oversight. AT&T is pushing the outer limits of deregulation, seeking a world in which companies can use one-sided contracts to grant themselves immunity from accountability for a vast range of wrongdoing. Concepcion represents a giant leap toward a dystopian legal system that the Supreme Court should have rejected out of hand -- lawlessness for major corporations and corporate-made law for the rest of us.
But the Court rubber-stamped AT&T's scheme, so we need the Congress and administrative agencies to protect us. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act gives the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the authority to eliminate abuses like AT&T's within their jurisdictions. The CFPB and SEC should get to work quickly. To solve the problem in every industry, not just financial services, Congress should pass the Arbitration Fairness Act, which Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) plan to introduce next week.
Sign a petition to support the Arbitration Fairness Act.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-arkush/us-supreme-court-to-major_b_854714.html?view=print

Nan Aron

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AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: The Corporate Court Does it Again

Posted: 04/29/11 11:46 AM ET
The Corporate Court is at it again. This time the case is AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and this week's 5-4 decision in favor of the cell-phone giant is yet another far-reaching betrayal of some of the most fundamental principles of American justice.
In this case, big business, with AT&T as its stalking horse, asked the Supreme Court to protect it from all those cheeky consumers and impudent employees who might have the temerity to complain that they're being ripped off or discriminated against. The ultra-conservative majority on the Court found a way to keep all those annoying individuals from banding together in group arbitration or in the courts, where they would have the benefit of lawyers and all those pesky constitutional rights and rules of civil procedure.
The result of the decision by Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy is to make sure that when people like you enter the legal arena against a corporation, you go all by yourself into a system that's rigged against you.
Even if your name isn't Concepcion or you don't have an AT&T cell phone, this case is about you. Almost all of us operate in a world filled with employment agreements or corporate contracts for things like cell phones, credit cards, or online accounts. But if at some point you discover you've been cheated or your civil rights have been violated, you'll find that that you've signed away your ability to enter a courthouse to fight back. In this country, you can't buy a cell phone or take a job without agreeing to disempower yourself.
The culprit is right there in the fine-print or in the lengthy agreement you scroll through without reading before you click on the button that says, "I agree." The contract mandates that if the company does you wrong, you're absolutely forbidden to get together with others similarly harmed and sue in court or demand group arbitration. If you still want to complain, you have to submit to binding arbitration for your case alone. And who sets up the arbitration system? Why, the corporation, of course!
California had a rule that agreements that compel consumers or employees to give up their rights to form class actions are "unconscionable," and therefore invalid, when they protect companies that try to cheat lots of people out of small sums. The Supreme Court this week said that the Federal Arbitration Act was in conflict with California's rule, even though all of the Court's past rulings and the long-standing interpretation of the statute said otherwise. (So much for conservatives' belief in states' rights. When the conflict is between profits and principles, this Court has a clear favorite.)
Thanks to the Court, corporations are now free to write contracts that legally bar you from challenging them in class-action lawsuits or even group arbitration, no matter what they do to harm you. There is no mystery why the Chamber of Commerce and several large corporations filed briefs in this case.
The upshot is that corporations will now be able to decide on their own which civil rights and consumer protections they want to obey, knowing that there will be no effective means available to their victims to find redress. Even worse, not only has the radical conservative majority damaged the ability of consumers or employees to find justice, it has effectively removed any incentive for corporations to behave within the law in the first place. Why act lawfully if your victims are helpless, especially in cases like this when the harm to each individual is small but the potential for profit is huge?
This case, after all, was about a $30.22 charge for a "free" cell phone. That amount is so small that almost no one would go through the hassle and expense of fighting it out with the company one-on-one, especially in a system that's rigged by the corporation. AT&T counted on that. You can make a lot of money taking $30 at a time from hundreds of thousands of people. But if those people are able to unite with others who were similarly ripped off, suddenly the cost/benefit equation changes. With enough money at stake to make a class-action suit feasible, not only can lots of consumers get justice who otherwise might not bother, but the prospect of a big payout provides an incentive for the company to act responsibly.
But as of yesterday, that possibility is gone.
This Corporate Court, at the behest of big-business interests, is systematically draining away the rights of everyday Americans. This misguided decision must not be allowed to stand. Congress should act swiftly to end forced arbitration in civil rights, consumer, and employment disputes and restore the ability of every citizen to use the courts to find justice.

An Alliance for Justice report summarizing the facts and issues of the case, "AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: Will the Supreme Court Give AT&T a License to Steal?" can be downloaded here.
 
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Supreme Court ruling is bad news for consumers


It went nearly unnoticed in a week of royal matrimony and birth certificates. The Republican-appointed majority on the Supreme Court gave corporations a major victory at the expense of consumers. The ruling bars class action lawsuits that allow unhappy customers to band together to fight unfair business practices.
The case came from California, where a couple had bought a discount cell phone and were surprised by a $30 fee based on the full purchase price. They sued on behalf of other ill-treated customers, but the cell phone firm, AT&T Mobility, fought it all the way to the high court, which ruled in favor of the company.
Not to worry, said the court majority, because each case can go to arbitration, as provided by a 1925 federal law. The bundling of complaints into class action lawsuits isn't allowed under the statute.
But that reading was simplistic and naive, the dissenting judges said. The law allowed for exceptions to the arbitration-only rule. More important, it put consumers in an impossible position: spend time and effort to go through arbitration for a small sum, knowing that no lawyer will take a case for the measly amount at stake.
The case blesses shady business tactics. Firms can get away with credit card overcharges, unauthorized fees or a phony bill because a showdown class action lawsuit isn't allowed. The ruling casts a shadow on another case before the high court in which 1.5 million women are seeking to bring a class action case against Wal-Mart for sex discrimination.
Congress could fix the situation by mending the arbitration law to allow for group lawsuits. But that's hard to imagine given the pro-business GOP majority in the House, no doubt delighted by the ruling.
Another path could be rules put forward by the new federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created as part of a package of Wall Street reforms. That route will take time as the new agency, appointed by the Obama White House, establishes itself.
But the need should be clear. Consumers demand protections, not a runaround, when unfair treatment occurs. The court decision shouldn't be the last word.
This article appeared on page A - 9 of the San Francisco Chronicle


Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/04/29/EDQJ1J9PMH.DTL#ixzz1KzGtCOZg
 

Supreme Court: AT&T can force arbitration, block class-action suits

The Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that AT&T—and indeed, any company—could block class-action suits arising from disputes with customers and instead force those customers into binding arbitration. The ruling reverses previous lower-court decisions that classified stipulations in AT&T's service contract which barred class arbitration as "unconscionable."
The particular case at hand, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, stemmed from a California couple (the Concepcions) that had been charged sales tax on mobile phones that AT&T had advertised as "free." The couple believed the charges were unfair and constituted false advertising and fraud on the part of AT&T. They filed a lawsuit against AT&T, which was later promoted to class-action status. AT&T attempted to have the case dismissed on the grounds that its service contract requires individual arbitration and bars "any purported class or representative proceeding."
AT&T and others have similarly tried to have class-action cases dismissed on these grounds, though state supreme courts in both California and Washington have held that contractual waivers for class arbitration or litigation are "unconscionable" and therefore void based on those states' consumer protection laws. Using this reasoning, courts have allowed class-action lawsuits to proceed despite the contractual requirement for individual arbitration.
AT&T appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, though the court noted that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Since California consumer protection laws allow "unconscionable" contract clauses to be vacated, and the FAA includes the provision that arbitration agreements could be ruled unenforceable if law provided for the revocation of the contract, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the class-action case could proceed.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's decision. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the purpose of the FAA was designed to promote arbitration over more costly and lengthy litigation. Quoting an earlier ruling by the court, Scalia explained that "[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results,'" and that requiring the class-action litigation to proceed would be at odds with the intent of the FAA and the benefits that arbitration agreements ostensibly provide.
Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, noted that the saving clause in the FAA left ground for individual states to determine how a contract or its clauses may be revoked. "[R]ecognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold California's law, not to strike it down," he wrote.
The decision, which fell precisely along ideological lines, could have far-reaching effects on consumers' ability to challenge corporations in court over future disputes. In cases where an unfair practice affects large numbers of customers, AT&T or other companies could quietly settle a few individual claims instead of being faced with larger class-action settlements which might include punitive awards designed to discourage future bad practices.
Tried to find someone to defennd this injustice but couldn't. Please email me if you can find rational defense of the onion. Soo here is WSJ, best I can do right now.

After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?

goodbyepartyLast November, we ginned up this blog post about a Supreme Court case that, were it ruled on in favor of AT&T, could spell the death-knell of consumer class actions.
Well, on Wednesday, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, with AT&T garnering a winning five votes.
And should we prepare that going-away party? It’s too soon to know, of course, but this is the outcome predicted by Vanderbilt Law Professor Brian Fitzpatrick last year. Wrote Fitzpatrick:
If the court goes down AT&T’s path, the consequences could be staggering. It could be the end of class action litigation. . . . [V]irtually all class actions today occur between parties who are in transactional relationships with one another: shareholders and corporations, consumers and merchants, employees and employers. Because they are in transactional relationships, they are able to enter arbitration agreements with class action waivers.
Once given the green light, it is hard to imagine any company would not want its shareholders, consumers and employees to agree to such provisions.
Okay, okay. But we just might be getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s back up.
Vincent and Liza Concepcion sued AT&T for deceptive practices because the company allegedly advertised discounted cell phones but charged sales tax on the full retail price. So the Concepcions sued on behalf of a class of consumers who’d also allegedly overpaid.
Thing is, the contract with AT&T, as such contracts typically do, required all claims to be resolved through arbitration, and that the arbitration could not move forward as a class.
Both a California federal district court and the Ninth Circuit struck down the contract, ruling that it was imposed upon consumers and therefore violated public policy.
AT&T appealed, arguing that that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state contract law and allows class-action exemptions when they’re combined with arbitration.
On Wednesday, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, agreed with that analysis, ruling that the company can enforce a contract provision that requires customers to arbitrate their disputes individually. Click here for the 39-page opinion (18 of which compose Scalia’s opinion); here for the WSJ story; here for Scotusblog’s page on the case.
Joining Scalia were Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Justice Stephen Breyer penned a dissent, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginbsurg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
Scalia said allowing the case to proceed as a class action would run afoul of a federal law that promotes arbitration. “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons,” Justice Scalia wrote.
In his dissent, however, Breyer said requiring consumers to arbitrate cases on an individual basis could lead claimants to abandon small-money cases rather than litigate.
“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”

Bet some of you nonlawyers are looking at the cable bill contract, huh. We lawyers know it is there. (LOL)


Wednesday, April 20, 2011

First banker lender conviction on Mortgage scam-farkas

Suevon Lee has done a great job covering this story. They basically just "made up" 300 million or so of loans. Made up didnt exist ghost loans. More indictments coming..... 

 

Farkas guilty on all 14 counts

Published: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 at 5:15 p.m.
Last Modified: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 at 5:15 p.m.
Alexandria, Va. - A jury on Tuesday found Lee Bentley Farkas, the former chairman and majority shareholder of Ocala's Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., guilty on 14 counts of bank, wire and securities fraud for his role in a two billion-dollar fraud scheme that toppled the mortgage company and a major bank.

Click to enlarge
Lee Farkas


Sentencing for Farkas, 58, will be July 1 at the federal courthouse here before U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. The defendant, who was taken into custody, will be held at a local jail pending a bond hearing ahead of sentencing. He faces 20 years or more in prison on each count, which includes fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.
The 12-member jury took just a day and a half to arrive at guilty verdicts on all counts included in the indictment against Farkas following a 10-day trial that began April 4. The government's case featured testimony from 23 witnesses, including six co-conspirators, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae representatives and officials from major financial institutions that once invested in Taylor Bean.
In a conference call with reporters late Tuesday afternoon, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, praised the jury for its work, calling the seven-year fraud scheme "shockingly brazen."
"The financial crisis has many faces, and today Lee Farkas' is one of them," he said. "Mr. Farkas thought he could steal nearly $3 billion from investors and taxpayers and sail into the sunset. I think he thought and hoped that, but now a jury has told him otherwise and he must face the consequences of his act."
In what the government has called "one of the largest and longest-running fraud schemes in the country," Farkas, with the help of co-conspirators, was accused of selling fake loan assets to Colonial Bank to the tune of $1.4 billion while diverting up to $1.5 billion in funds from financing vehicle Ocala Funding LLC to help cover the company's operating expenses.
Prosecutors said the scheme, which ran from December 2003 to August 2009, evolved to target federal bailout money when Taylor Bean led a failed effort to raise $300 million in capital so Colonial BancGroup Inc. could receive $553 million in Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds. As the deal unraveled over accounting irregularities, Taylor Bean's Ocala headquarters and Colonial's Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division in Orlando were raided by federal agents. Both institutions filed for bankruptcy in August 2009.
Farkas was arrested outside a gym in Ocala on June 15, 2010, almost a year after his company — which he purchased in 1991 and turned into one of the largest home mortgage lenders in the country — was forced to close its doors and lay off 2,400 employees nationwide.
He was the only person tied to the downfall of Taylor Bean and Colonial who has gone to trial. Six co-conspirators — Taylor Bean's former CEO Paul R. Allen, president Ray Bowman, treasurer Desiree Brown, senior financial analyst Sean Ragland, and Colonial Bank's MWLD supervisor Cathie Kissick, along with her deputy, Teresa Kelly — entered guilty pleas shortly before Farkas' trial began and will be sentenced by Brinkema in June. They face penalties ranging from five up to 30 years in prison on fraud-related charges.
Each offered testimony at trial identifying Farkas as the one driving the decisions behind different elements of the scheme, which began with a sweeping of funds averaging tens of millions of dollars at Colonial Bank to cover Taylor Bean overdrafts. The scheme grew to incorporate selling fake or impaired loans to Colonial, once one of the 50 largest banks in the country before it was seized by regulators and placed into receivership.
Farkas took the stand as the defense's fourth and final witness last week, claiming he had no participation in the sweeping of funds, no direct management over Ocala Funding and no knowledge of the sale of fake mortgage loans to Colonial. He said any mistakes, which he called unintentional, were the result of his company's too-rapid growth.
Bruce Rogow, Farkas' defense attorney, said Tuesday he was disappointed with the verdict.
"We had hoped the jury would have accepted what was the truth: that the six people pled guilty not because they were guilty but because they were seeking to minimize the sentences the government threatened them with," he said.
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http://www.ocala.com/article/20110419/articles/110419692?tc=ar

Friday, April 15, 2011

Lest ya doubt about Goldman sachs, Senate report says the same


Goldman Sachs Ripped Off And Misled Clients, Senate Report Says

Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein
First Posted: 04/15/11 04:15 PM ET Updated: 04/15/11 04:58 PM ET
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Goldman Sachs, the nation's fifth-largest bank by assets, systematically misled clients, sold them financial instruments it knew to be junk, bet against them and profited off of their losses, according to a Senate report released this week.
The report, the product of a two-year investigation, paints the firm as Exhibit A of Wall Street's evolution from a place that raises and deploys capital to worthy businesses into a vulturous creature that preys on unwitting investors.
Goldman's conduct in the two years leading up to the near-implosion of the financial system show a firm dedicated to "sticking it to their own clients," said Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who chairs the panel that produced the report. "Goldman gained at the expense of their clients, and used abusive practices to do it."
In 2006 and 2007, Goldman recorded more than $21 billion in profit thanks to a strategy that ensured earnings as the housing bubble inflated and then popped. It also dodged a loss in 2008 -- one of the few firms to do so -- during a year that saw the demise of three of its direct competitors.
The "abusive" tactics the firm employed helped gain those winnings, according to the report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. While Goldman was betting -- or "shorting," in Wall Street parlance -- that securities would collapse, clients were on the losing end.
"Of course we didn't dodge the mortgage mess," Goldman chairman and chief executive Lloyd C. Blankfein explained to a colleague in a Nov. 18, 2007 email documented in the report. "We lost money, then made more than we lost because of shorts."
Four complex financial instruments with names like Timberwolf and Abacus show how the firm profited while others lost, according to the Senate report.
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Goldman declined to comment for this article.
Timberwolf was a $1 billion collateralized debt obligation squared, meaning it was a financial instrument comprised of other CDOs that were backed by various types of securities, like mortgage bonds and insurance contracts. Goldman issued the security, formally called Timberwolf I, in March 2007. It began to lose value almost immediately upon issuance.
But Goldman was a step ahead of its clients. It immediately shorted about 36 percent of the assets underlying Timberwolf, meaning it would profit off their demise. Investors were kept in the dark about this development, according to the Senate report.
In May 2007, Goldman promised one future buyer it could earn a 60 percent return on its investment in Timberwolf, even though Goldman's interval valuations of the security showed the CDO was continuing to fall in value, the report notes.
The prospective buyer, a hedge fund named Basis Capital, finally bought slices of Timberwolf on June 18 of that year, at prices of 84 cents and 76 cents on the dollar. Less than a month later, Goldman marked them down to 65 and 60 cents.
Even Goldman salesmen had second thoughts about the firm's practice of marking down securities within days or weeks of a client's purchase.
"Real bad feeling across European sales about some of the trades we did with clients," one of the firm's salesmen wrote in an October 2007 email to the head of Goldman's mortgage unit, Daniel Sparks. "The damage this has done to our franchise is significant. Aggregate loss for our clients on just...5 trades alone is 1bln+ [more than $1 billion]."
A few months earlier, a senior Goldman executive warned his colleagues about selling clients securities at one price and then immediately devaluing them.
"[D]on't think we can trade this with our clients [and] then mark them down dramatically the next day," Harvey Schwartz wrote in a May 11 email.
On July 13, Basis told Goldman that one of its funds was in "real trouble," according to the Senate report. Three days later, Goldman marked down those securities to 55 and 45 cents on the dollar. Within weeks, Basis Capital liquidated its hedge fund.
Goldman bought back the Timberwolf securities at prices of 30 and 25 cents on the dollar.
Another Timberwolf buyer, Bank Hapoalim, purchased a $9 million slice at about 78 cents on the dollar. The Israeli-based bank didn't know that Goldman's internal valuations at the same time pegged the slice at just 55 cents on the dollar.
Last week, another bank, Wells Fargo was fined $11 million by the Securities and Exchange Commission because the firm it took over, Wachovia, did something similar when it sold a client a slice of a security at 90-95 cents on the dollar even though Wachovia internally valued it at 52.7 cents on the dollar. In announcing the settlement, the SEC's director of enforcement, Robert Khuzami, said the lender violated "basic investor protection rules -- don't charge secret excessive markups, and don't use stale prices when telling buyers that assets are priced at fair market value."
In the end, though Goldman eventually lost some money on Timberwolf because it couldn't sell all of it, its losses were offset by profits made from betting those securities would fall in value. Goldman profited "at the expense of its clients," according to the report. Meanwhile, the buyers lost virtually everything. Basis Capital ended up declaring bankruptcy.
Another CDO, called Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1, was a $2 billion financial instrument brought to market in December 2006.
Goldman shorted all of Hudson, meaning it would profit if any of the slices lost value, according to the Senate report. Goldman "failed to disclose to potential investors that it was shorting the very securities [it] was selling to them," the report notes.
Instead, Goldman told investors that it had "aligned incentives" with them because it invested in a portion of Hudson. The report called that "misleading" because Goldman's $6 million bet that Hudson would rise in value was "outweighed many times over by Goldman's $2 billion short position."
Goldman also told investors that the assets underlying Hudson were "sourced from the Street," as in other Wall Street firms. In reality, all of the assets were acquired from a unit inside Goldman. Two Goldman executives later told Senate investigators that the firm's original description was accurate because Goldman was part of "the Street."
Goldman made a $1.35 billion profit off Hudson, earnings the Senate report described as coming "at the expense of [its] clients."
Similar practices occurred with two other Goldman CDOs, named Anderson Mezzanine 2007-1 and Abacus 2007-AC1.
In Abacus, Goldman allegedly helped set up the mortgage-linked investment for a favored client, designing it to fail, yet sold it anyway to its other clients, reaping the favored client nearly $1 billion. Last year, the SEC charged Goldman with securities fraud. The firm later settled the accusations for $550 million.
In Anderson, the Senate report claims Goldman bet that 40 percent of the assets underlying the deal would decline in value. Investors were never told. They also weren't told that Goldman expressed reservations about the quality of the subprime mortgages that helped make up Anderson.
Anderson investors were eventually wiped out and lost virtually their entire investments, according to the Senate investigation.
"The evidence discloses troubling and sometimes abusive practices which show...that Goldman knowingly sold high risk, poor quality mortgage products to clients around the world," according to the Senate report. It also alleges "multiple conflicts of interest" surrounding Goldman's CDO activities.
Previously, Goldman has defended its conduct and rejected accusations it did anything improper during the leadup to the financial meltdown.
"Goldman Sachs did not engage in some type of massive 'bet' against our clients," the firm said in a statement last year. "[We] never created mortgage-related products that were designed to fail."
The firm also has said that buyers of such securities were "large, sophisticated investors" that had "significant in-house research staff to analyze portfolios and structures and to suggest modifications."
The investors "did not rely upon the issuing banks in making their investment decisions," Goldman said in a December 2009 statement. Also, the firm maintains that "it is fully disclosed and well known to investors" that Wall Street firms that arranged CDOs initially shorted the securities and that "these positions could either have been applied as hedges against other risk positions or covered via trades with other investors."
"Many major banks had similar businesses," the firm noted.
The report makes note of federal securities laws that Goldman may have violated.
"Goldman...had an obligation to disclose material information that a reasonable investor would want to know," the report notes.
Levin said his investigators found a "financial snake pit rife with greed, conflicts of interest, and wrongdoing."
Last year's financial reform law includes a section authored by Levin that tries to clean up the markets by prohibiting firms from betting against securities they sell to their clients. Levin pointed to Goldman's activities as a primary reason for why he wanted that in the new law.
As of 3 p.m. New York time, Goldman shares were down more than 3 percent since Levin's report was publicly released. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index is up about 0.6 percent.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Lest ye doubt me about Goldman here again....

Goldman Traders Tried to Manipulate Derivatives Market in '07, Report Says

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) mortgage traders tried to manipulate prices of derivatives linked to subprime home loans in May 2007 for their own benefit, according to a U.S. Senate report.
Company documents show traders led by Michael J. Swenson sought to encourage a “short squeeze” by putting artificially low prices on derivatives that would gain in value as mortgage securities fell, according to the report yesterday by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The idea, abandoned after market conditions worsened, was to drive holders of such credit-default swaps to sell and help Goldman Sachs traders buy at reduced prices, according to the report.
“We began to encourage this squeeze, with plans of getting very short again,” Deeb Salem, a trader in the structured product group, said in a 2007 self-evaluation excerpted in the report. Swenson, Salem’s supervisor, sent e-mails in May 2007 urging traders to offer prices that will “cause maximum pain” and “have people totally demoralized.” In interviews with the committee, Salem and Swenson denied attempting a short squeeze, the report said.
Salem “claimed that he had wrongly worded his self- evaluation,” the report said. “He said that reading his self- evaluation as a description of an intended short squeeze put too much emphasis on ‘words.’”
The subcommittee cited the episode as an example of how Goldman Sachs traders placed the firm’s interests ahead of its clients’ as the value of mortgage-linked investments tumbled in 2007. The subcommittee, led by Senator Carl M. Levin, a Michigan Democrat and Tom Coburn, Republican of Oklahoma, has called on regulators to craft strict bans on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest to keep the problems from recurring.

‘Poor Quality Investments’

“Conflicts of interests related to proprietary investments led Goldman to conceal its adverse financial interests from potential investors, sell investors poor quality investments, and place its financial interests before those of its clients,” according to the subcommittee.
Goldman Sachs traders abandoned the short-squeeze attempt after discovering on June 7, 2007, that two Bear Stearns Cos. hedge funds that specialized in subprime-mortgage investments were collapsing. Salem e-mailed Swenson and another colleague to suggest trying to buy short positions, known as “protection,” on collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, from hedge fund Magnetar Capital LLC, according to the subcommittee’s report.
“We need to go to magnetar and see if we can buy a bunch of cdo protection… Can tell them we have a protection buyer, who is looking to get into this trade now that spreads have tightened back in.”

‘Great Idea’

Swenson expressed “no concerns about the proposed deception” and responded to Salem that it was a “great idea,” according to the report.
The report comes almost a year after the committee spent more than 10 hours grilling Lloyd C. Blankfein, Goldman Sachs’s chairman and chief executive officer, and six current and former employees in one of the most hostile political showdowns in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
That hearing happened 12 days after the Securities and Exchange Commission sued New York-based Goldman Sachs for fraud in a case that the firm settled for $550 million in July.
In an effort to address questions raised by the SEC lawsuit and the subcommittee, Blankfein convened a committee of Goldman Sachs executives to review the firm’s practices. In January, the firm published 39 recommendations aimed at better managing conflicts and client relationships, as well as governance and employee training.

Citigroup, Merrill Lynch

Goldman Sachs disagrees with “many of the conclusions” in the report and cited the business standards committee as evidence that “we take seriously the issues explored by the subcommittee,” the firm said in a statement released by Lucas van Praag, a company spokesman.
As rivals including Citigroup Inc. (C) and Merrill Lynch & Co. posted losses on mortgage-related investments during 2007, Goldman Sachs reported record earnings that benefited from the firm’s negative view of the subprime-mortgage market.
Blankfein and other executives at the firm have said that its traders placed “short” bets, which profited when prices of mortgage-linked securities fell, to hedge against losses. He also said in last year’s hearing that Goldman Sachs was acting as a “market maker” in selling CDOs and other mortgage-backed investments to clients as the company’s own traders were betting against them.

‘Massive Short’

“We didn’t have a massive short against the housing market, and we certainly did not bet against our clients,” Blankfein, 56, who received a record $67.9 million bonus for his performance in 2007, told the subcommittee last year. “Rather, we believe that we managed our risk as our shareholders and our regulators would expect.”
The subcommittee said that documents uncovered in its two- year investigation of the financial crisis show that Goldman Sachs’s mortgage traders did have a large short position during 2007 and the sales team aggressively sought clients to buy CDOs that the traders expected would decline in value.
One executive “instructed Goldman personnel not to provide written information to investors about how Goldman was valuing” a CDO called Timberwolf, according to the report, “and its sales force offered no additional assistance to potential investors trying to evaluate the 4,500 underlying assets.”
Joshua S. Birnbaum, who ran a unit called the ABX Trading Desk, said in an October 2007 internal presentation that a short position established by the structured product group after the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds was “not a hedge” against CDOs and residential mortgage-backed securities, or RMBS, owned by the firm, the report said.

‘Not a Hedge’

“By June, all retained CDO and RMBS positions were identified already hedged,” the presentation said. “In other words, the shorts were not a hedge.”
The subcommittee’s report describes four CDOs that the firm created and sold in an effort to reduce Goldman Sachs’s exposure to subprime-mortgage risk. It describes Goldman Sachs as having given misleading descriptions of some of the CDOs and in some cases seeking out buyers who were inexperienced with them.
The report also says that the mortgage desk reversed its view on how it marked derivatives values based on its position in the market. Clients with short positions complained that Goldman Sachs was undervaluing those bets during the squeeze attempt. After the traders abandoned that strategy in June 2007 and increased their wagers against the mortgage market, other clients complained the firm was overvaluing the short positions.
“Once it began buying CDS shorts, the SPG Desk immediately changed its CDS short valuations and began increasing their value,” the report said. “Clients with long positions began to complain that the marks were too high, and internal Goldman business units also raised questions.”
To contact the reporters on this story: Christine Harper in New York at charper@bloomberg.net; Joshua Gallu in Washington at jgallu@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: David Scheer at dscheer@bloomberg.net